Unit
Years: 1846-1857
Freedom & Equal Rights
Historical Events, Movements, and Figures
The Missouri Compromise was a significant piece of legislation passed by the United States Congress in 1820. It aimed to address the issue of the expansion of slavery into new territories acquired by the United States. The Missouri Compromise was a landmark legislative agreement aimed at preserving the delicate balance between free and slave states in the United States, but it ultimately failed to resolve the deeper divisions over the issue of slavery.
In 1857 when Dred Scott, an enslaved American, brought suit against his current enslaver, John F. A. Sanford, the country was embroiled in a heated debate over the influence of the institution of slavery on the country. Scott sued for his family’s freedom because he believed that his time living in free territories, protected by the Missouri Compromise, made his status as a slave illegal. Mr. Scott’s case rose to national prominence because it represented many of the concerns from both sides of the debate. The case raised questions about what constitutional rights African Americans had and whether the Missouri Compromise could limit the spread of slavery in the country.
The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Taney, called into question many ideas associated with citizenship and the status of African Americans in the United States. Americans across the country reacted strongly to the decision and the implications of the case would have long-lasting impacts on American society.
Document 3.15.3: Excerpts from the Dred Scott Decision written by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney of the United States Supreme Court, March 1857
Roger B. Taney, Dred Scott Decision, 1857, GLC 1259
Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the Court…
In the opinion of the Court the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves nor their descendents, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument…
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the Negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race…
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country should induce the Court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted…
And upon a full and careful consideration of the subject, the Court is of the opinion that, upon the facts stated in the plea in abatement, Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States and not entitled as such to sue in its courts…
We proceed…to inquire whether the facts relied on by the plaintiff entitled him to his freedom…
The act of Congress, upon which the plaintiff relies, declares that slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, shall be forever prohibited in all that part of the territory ceded by France, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude and not included within the limits of Missouri. And the difficulty which meets us…is whether Congress was authorized to pass this law under any of the powers granted to it by the Constitution…
As there is no express regulation in the Constitution defining the power which the general government may exercise over the person or property of a citizen in a territory thus acquired, the Court must necessarily look to the provisions and principles of the Constitution, and its distribution of powers, for the rules and principles by which its decisions must be governed.
Taking this rule to guide us, it may be safely assumed that citizens of the United States who migrate to a territory…cannot be ruled as mere colonists, dependent upon the will of the general government, and to be governed by any laws it may think proper to impose…
For example, no one, we presume, will contend that Congress can make any law in a territory respecting the establishment of religion…or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press…
These powers, and others…are…denied to the general government; and the rights of private property have been guarded with equal care…
An act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, without due process of law, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular territory of the United States…could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.
The powers over person and property of which we speak are not only not granted to Congress but are in express terms denied and they are forbidden to exercise them…And if Congress itself cannot do this…it could not authorize a territorial government to exercise them…
It seems, however, to be supposed that there is a difference between property in a slave and other property…
Now…the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guaranteed to the citizens of the United States, in every state that might desire it, for twenty years. And the government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time if the slave escapes from his owner. This is done in plain words—too plain to be misunderstood. And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property or which entitles property of that kind to less protection that property of any other description…
Upon these considerations it is the opinion of the Court that the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned is not warranted by the Constitution and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family, were made free by being carried into this territory; even if they had been carried there by the owner with the intention of becoming a permanent resident.Source: Davis,
David Brian and Steven Mintz. The Boisterous Sea of Liberty: A Documentary History of America from Discovery through the Civil War.
Document 3.15.4: Excerpt from dissenting opinion written by Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis of the United States Supreme Judicial Court, March 1857
Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis of Massachusetts protested Taney’s conclusions.
At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation [1781], all free native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended from African slaves, were not only citizens of those states, but such of them as had the other necessary qualifications possessed the franchises of electors, on equal terms with other citizens. . . these colored persons were not only included in the body of ‘the people of the United States,’ by whom the Constitution was ordained and established, but in at least five of the States they had the power to act, and doubtless did act, by their suffrages, upon the question of adoption. . . .Curtis also argued that under a “reasonable interpretation of the language of the Constitution,” Congress had the power to regulate slavery in the federal territories.
Source: dissenting opinion in the U.S. Supreme Court Case Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sanford, March 6, 1857; Case Files 1792-1995; Record Group 267; Records of the Supreme Court of the United States; National Archives.
Document 3.15.7: Excerpts from the Pittsburgh Gazette, 7 March 1857
Is it [illegible] the threshold of the fierce struggle thrust before the people of this nation, we design, that there shall be no misunderstanding as to our position on the great point raised by the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case. We shall treat the so-called decision of that Court as an utter nullity. It is not law, and it has no binding force upon either the people or the government. It is not an authoritative interpretation of the Constitution, nor is it, legally, a decision entitled to any weight whatever. It is simply a demagogical stump speech from the hustings of the supreme bench, got up in legal phrase to suit the necessities of the Buchanan administration. The Judges of the Supreme Court have therein simply abandoned the robe and the ermine to achieve the task of framing a new platform for the locofoco party.
Look at the facts in the case. Dred Scott, an alleged Missouri slave, brings a suit against his claimant, for his freedom, upon the ground that his master, having voluntarily removed him from Missouri on to free soil, he thereby became free. The Supreme Court decide that Dred Scott is not a citizen of Missouri or of the United States, and therefore was not entitled to bring a suit in that Court; hence they dismiss his suit for want of jurisdiction. That, then, was the only point for them to decide, and that decided, there was an end of the case. The suit fell because the party bringing it had no rights in that Court.
Beyond this legal point the Court had no power to decide anything. They had no right to go into the merits of a case, when the case itself was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. All that follows is simply extra judicial and is entitled to be regarded only as the unauthorized opinion of so many individuals.
At the time when Chief Justice Marshall was on the bench, he gave it as the opinion of the Court, incidentally, that Congress had full and unlimited power over the Territories. This opinion was once cited in the Senate, to Gen. Cass, as authoritative and conclusive; but Gen. Cass replied that the opinion was an incidental one, foreign to the case at issue, and was a mere obiter dictum —an opinion, but not law. The Democratic party sustained Gen. Cass in this view, and from that day to this has refused to be bound by that decision of the Supreme Court. On the same ground we object to this decision. It is a mere opinion, delivered in a case in which the Court admitted it had no jurisdiction—a mere obiter dictum, devoid of all legal force or authority…
We cannot speak for the Republican party; but we feel free to say that it will spurn this decision and, when its day of triumph comes, and come it will, sweep into oblivion the base, reckless and unjust Judges who have prostituted their high offices to purposes so vile.
The Constitution was ordained to establish Justice and secure the blessings of Liberty to the people; and it will be worth one struggle, at least, to prevent it from being thus turned from its high aims to subserve the lusts of tyranny. The Constitution was made by the people and for the people; and to the people, the sovereign power in this confederacy, we appeal from this decision. They understand the charter of their liberties, we hope, full well enough to rebuke and defeat, at the polls, this effort to give the whole country up to the domination of the slave power.
Source: www.br-anch.org/survey/docs/pittsburgh.htm
Document 3.15.8: Excerpts from “The Question Settled,” New Hampshire Patriot, 18 March 1857
The Question Settled.—Black Republicanism vs. the Constitution.
Concord, New Hampshire, New Hampshire Patriot
We give in this paper an abstract of the decision of the U S. Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case, in which it is solemnly adjudged and decided, by the highest judicial tribunal of the Union, that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, and that Congress has no constitutional power or authority to legislate upon the subject of slavery in the Territories. It will be seen that other incidental questions were decided in this case, but this is the one of the most political importance, and interest. It utterly demolishes the whole black republican platform and stamps it as directly antagonistical to the constitution. This is the end of the matter, so far as argument and voting and legislation are concerned. The constitution is the supreme law; the Supreme Court is the authorized interpreter of the constitution; the construction which that tribunal puts upon that instrument is, for all practical purposes, the constitution itself, and therefore their decision must be fully and freely acquiesced in by all good citizens. That decision is now the supreme law of the land; it is practically the constitution itself, being the meaning and intent of that instrument as officially interpreted and declared by the tribunal authorized to interpret it, and from whose decision there is no appeal. Resistance to that decision is, therefore, resistance to the constitution—to the government—to the Union itself. It cannot be made legally , rightfully, peacefully, or with the least chance or hope of success. That decision must be carried into effect—that interpretation must be acquiesced in and acted upon, or else it must be resisted by force. There is no other alternative. It is the law, the constitution, and will be respected and acted upon by the constituted authorities, no matter to what party they belong nor what their private views may be in regard to it. It cannot be evaded; if Congress and the President should undertake to resist it, the effort would be futile. In a word, we repeat, nothing but force, open rebellion, can successfully oppose the practical application and enforcement of the decision of the court in this case.
But what is the course and talk of the black republican organs upon this subject? Why, one would suppose, from their talk, that the decision of the highest judicial tribunal of the Union is of no binding force! The N Y. Tribune even declares that their decision in this case is entitled to "no more weight than would be the judgment of a majority in a Washington bar-room," and other black papers declare the judges to be "scoundrels," and Benedict Arnolds, and the black press and pulpit unite in reviling the court and denouncing their decision!
Now this only goes prove, what we have heretofore alleged, that the black republican creed and purposes are at war with the constitution, are treasonable, and contemplate the overthrow of the Union. It only goes to show that their leaders stand precisely upon Garrison's platform, and that the road to the attainment of their objects lies over the ruins of the constitution and the Union. There is no escape from this; they preach resistance to law, to the supreme law—resistance to what is authoritatively adjudged to be the constitution. Such resistance, if carried into practical effect, would be treason; and all who preach it, preach treason, and all who seek to make a practical thing of it, seek to overthrow the constitution. This is the sum and substance of the matter; and all patriotic citizens—all who have a regard for the continued existence, peace and prosperity of the country, will [illegible] constitution, and to the government which is bound to respect and enforce it. . . .
Whoever now seeks to revive sectionalism, arrays himself against the constitution, and consequently, against the Union. Of course, it is to be expected that fanaticism will rave and clamor against the decision of the Supreme Court. But fanaticism ceases to be a formidable enemy when it seeks to measure strength with the Union-loving spirit of the people, sustained and confirmed by the great arbiter of constitutional questions. Fanaticism becomes powerless against such a combination, and hence we may smile at the madness with which the organs of black republicanism assail the late decision of the Supreme Court. It is the last dying fit of fanatical sectionalism. It will have the effect of fixing public attention upon the reckless wickedness which has heretofore impelled the sectional agitators to force the republic to the very verge of disruption.
We feel, therefore, that the danger is for the present over; that sectionalism is virtually dead—that it has been crushed out by the popular verdict in the presidential election; and that the decision of the Supreme Court had left nothing vital in republicanism, and has placed the Democratic party beyond and above all competition as the constitutional, national, Union party of the country. Mr. Buchanan takes the helm under these auspicious circumstances, and his acts thus far give token of a successful and prosperous administration.
Source: www.br-anch.org/survey/docs/question.htm
Document 3.15.5: Excerpt from notes Abraham Lincoln wrote in 1858 in advance of his “house divided” speech
Why Kansas is neither the whole, nor the tithe of the real question.
“A house divided cannot stand.”
I believe this government can not endure permanently half slave, and half free.
I expressed this belief a year ago; and subsequent developments have but confirmed me.
I do not expect the Union to be dissolved. I do not expect the house to fall; but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and put it in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old, as well as new. Do you doubt it? Study the Dred Scott decision, and then see, how little, even now, remains to be done.
From: “The Boisterous Sea of Liberty: A Documentary History of America from Discovery Through the Civil War” written and edited by David Brian Davis & Steven Mintz
Document 3.15.5: Excerpt from notes Abraham Lincoln wrote in 1858 in advance of his “house divided” speech
Why Kansas is neither the whole, nor the tithe of the real question.
“A house divided cannot stand.”
I believe this government can not endure permanently half slave, and half free.
I expressed this belief a year ago; and subsequent developments have but confirmed me.
I do not expect the Union to be dissolved. I do not expect the house to fall; but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and put it in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old, as well as new. Do you doubt it? Study the Dred Scott decision, and then see, how little, even now, remains to be done.
From: “The Boisterous Sea of Liberty: A Documentary History of America from Discovery Through the Civil War” written and edited by David Brian Davis & Steven Mintz
A person or entity against whom a legal action or lawsuit is brought, typically in a civil or criminal proceeding.
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A written opinion or statement issued by a judge or justice who disagrees with the majority decision in a court case, often outlining alternative legal reasoning or arguments.
A member or supporter of the Free Soil Party, a political party in the United States during the mid-19th century that opposed the expansion of slavery into the western territories and advocated for free soil, free labor, and free men.
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